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TO PLEA OR NOT TO PLEA: THE BENEFITS OF 
ESTABLISHING AN INSTITUTIONALIZED PLEA 
BARGAINING SYSTEM IN JAPAN 
Priyanka Prakash† 
Abstract: Plea bargaining, the practice that permits the prosecution and defense to 
negotiate reduced charges or a lighter sentence in exchange for the defendant’s guilty 
plea, is a bedrock component of the criminal justice system in many nations.  The 
Japanese legal community, however, has resisted introducing plea bargaining into Japan’s 
legal system.  From 2001 to 2004, the Japanese legislature passed over twenty reform 
laws to prepare the country’s criminal justice system for the demands of the twenty-first 
century, but provisions for plea bargaining were conspicuously absent from the reform 
package.  This is largely because the Japanese legal community views plea bargaining as 
antithetical to the Japanese justice system’s core values: obtaining the truth, encouraging 
the defendant’s remorse and rehabilitation, and protecting victims’ interests.  Resistance 
to plea bargaining in Japan takes on heightened significance in light of increasing 
pressures on the nation’s legal system to expedite criminal proceedings.  Currently, there 
are “tacit” informal types of plea bargaining that Japanese prosecutors use to simplify 
trial procedures.  This comment argues that tacit bargaining is an inadequate substitute 
for formal institutionalized plea bargaining.  While tacit bargaining may relieve burdens 
on congested Japanese criminal courts, tacit bargains are unenforceable, leaving the 
defendant without a remedy in the event the prosecution breaches the informal 
agreement.  The use of tacit bargaining is also concerning in regards to defendants’ rights 
because it sustains coercive aspects of the Japanese justice system and leads to 
uninformed, involuntary confessions.  In order to address Japan’s cultural aversions to 
plea bargaining, this comment examines the use of plea bargaining in international 
criminal tribunals.  These tribunals can serve as models for Japan because they have 
demonstrated that plea bargaining can aid rather than undermine the goals of the Japanese 
justice system. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the 
prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called ‘plea bargaining,’ is an 
essential component of the administration of justice.  Properly administered, 
it is to be encouraged.”—Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the United 
States Supreme Court.1  
 
                                           
†
 Juris Doctor expected in 2012, University of Washington School of Law.  The author would like 
to thank Professor Mary De Ming Fan and the editorial staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for 
their guidance in developing this comment.   
1
  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
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“[P]revailing legal sensibility recoil[s] at the thought that criminal 
justice could be a matter to be negotiated rather than imposed.”—Mirjan 
Damaška.2 
 
Plea bargaining is simultaneously one of the most frequently used 
practices in criminal justice systems around the globe and one of the most 
controversial practices.3  At its core, plea bargaining is a negotiation process 
between the prosecution and defense.4  It permits the defendant to admit 
incriminating facts or to plead guilty to one or more criminal charges in 
exchange for the prosecutor’s suspension of prosecution for other charges 
(charge bargaining) or recommendation of a lighter sentence (sentence 
bargaining).5  The practice is voluntary; criminal defendants must choose 
whether to waive their constitutional right to a jury trial and forgo the 
safeguards that a trial provides. 6   On the one hand, plea bargaining is 
considered vital for sustaining overburdened trial courts and prosecutorial 
staffs.7  On the other hand, some believe that plea bargaining treats guilty 
defendants too leniently and undermines the truth finding function of trial by 
pressuring innocent defendants into accepting a bargain.8 
The latter theory prevails in Japan, which lacks a formal plea 
bargaining system and whose legal community has long resisted adoption of 
such a system.9  Following a nationwide economic downturn in the 1990s, 
the Japanese government instituted a series of legal reforms proposed by the 
Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”) to strengthen the foundations of 
the country’s legal and administrative apparatuses for the twenty-first 
century.10  The JSRC specifically refused to recommend a system of plea 
                                           
2
  Mirjan Damaška, Negotiated Justice in International Criminal Courts, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 
1018, 1022 (2004). 
3
  George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (2000). 
4
  Anna Petrig, Negotiated Justice and the Goals of International Criminal Tribunals, 8 CHI.-KENT J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 4-5 (2008). 
5
  Id. 
6
  See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260; Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Plea Bargaining, REGULATION, 
Fall 2003, at 29, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv26n3/v26n3-8.pdf. 
7
  Fisher, supra note 3, at 867 (stating that plea bargaining “deliver[s] marvelously efficient relief 
from a suffocating workload [for judges and prosecutors]”). 
8
  See Roland Acevedo, Note, Is a Ban on Plea Bargaining an Abuse of Discretion? A Bronx 
County, New York Case Study, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 987, 992, 999-1000 (1995). 
9
  See Jean Choi Desombre, Comparing the Notions of the Japanese and the U.S. Criminal Justice 
System: An Examination of Pretrial Rights of the Criminally Accused in Japan and the United States, 14 
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 103, 124 (1995) (observing that truth-seeking and accuracy are central goals of the 
Japanese criminal justice system and that these goals would be undermined if innocent defendants pled 
guilty). 
10
  See THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
REFORM COUNCIL FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY intro. (2001), 
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bargaining, stating that it was important to develop efficient trial procedures 
but that there were “problems” associated with giving criminal defendants 
the choice to avoid trial.11  Accordingly, plea bargaining provisions were not 
among the reform laws passed by the Japanese legislature.12  In addition, 
Japanese legal professionals believe that plea bargaining is incompatible 
with the pursuit of justice within the Japanse system,13 which emphasizes 
truth seeking, the defendant’s remorse and rehabilitation, and the protection 
of victims’ interests.14  The rejection of plea bargaining by the JSRC, the 
Japanese legislature, and Japanese legal professionals assumes new urgency 
in light of rising pressures on the country’s criminal justice system to 
increase efficiency since the early 1990s.15 
Despite their resistance to institutionalized plea bargaining, key 
players in the Japanese legal system have sanctioned alternative kinds of 
bargaining in response to the demand for efficiency.16  The main response 
has been a system of “tacit” bargaining, in which there is an implicit, often 
unspoken, exchange of the defendant’s confession for lesser charges or 
recommendation of a more lenient sentence by the prosecutor.17   When 
defendants confess pursuant to a tacit bargain, they are usually convicted 
under expedited trial procedures. 18   Since some semblance of trial is 
preserved and prosecutors are not obligated to adhere to implicit bargains, 
                                                                                                                              
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/singikai/990612_e.html (citing Law Concerning 
Establishment of the Justice System Reform Council, art. 2, para. 1); Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The 
Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical Analysis of Japan’s Turn to Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31, 36 
(2006). 
11
  THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 10, at ch. II, pt. 2 § (1)(6). 
12
  See Daniel H. Foote, Justice System Reform in Japan, at 11-13, http://www.reds.msh-
paris.fr/communication/docs/foote.pdf (listing the major reforms that the Japanese legislature made, of 
which plea bargaining is not one). 
13
  See David T. Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan 411, 416-17 
(Jun. 7, 1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley) (on file with UMI 
Dissertation Services). 
14
  See Desombre, supra note 9, at 124 (noting the truth-seeking component of the Japanese justice 
system); Ingram Weber, The New Japanese Jury System: Empowering the Public, Preserving Continental 
Justice, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 125, 146-47 (2009) (noting the Japanese justice system’s commitment to the 
goals of rehabilitation and remorse); Arne F. Soldwedel, Testing Japan’s Convictions: The Lay Judge 
System and the Rights of Criminal Defendants, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1417, 1458-59 (2008) (noting 
that, as crimes have increased, the Japanese justice system has become increasingly focused on protecting 
victims’ rights rather than the rights of the accused). 
15
  See J. Sean Curtin, In Japan, the Crime Rate Also Rises, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, (Aug. 28, 2004), 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FH28Dh01.html (describing rising crime rate in Japan) (last visited 
April 25, 2011); JAPANESE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER ON CRIME tbl. 2-3-1-1 (2006) [hereinafter 
2006 WHITE PAPER ON CRIME], available at http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/en/55/nfm/n_55_2_2_3_1_1.html 
(showing decreasing number of trials in Japan since mid 1990s).  
16
  See JENIA I. TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS 173-74 (Hiram E. Chodosh ed., 2009). 
17
  Id. at 192. 
18
  Id. at 184-91. 
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tacit bargaining’s “unspoken exchange[s] of concessions” is more acceptable 
to the Japanese legal community than institutionalized plea bargaining.19  
Nonetheless, some view tacit bargaining as the “functional analogue” of 
formal, American-style plea bargaining.20 
This comment argues that the confession-reliant tacit bargaining now 
practiced in Japan is an ineffective substitute for a system of institutionalized 
plea bargaining.  Institutionalized plea bargaining achieves the ultimate 
efficiency goal of avoiding trial in two ways: it creates binding, enforceable 
bargains,21 and it yields benefits to both the defense and prosecution through 
negotiation.22  In contrast, tacit bargains are nonnegotiable and nonbinding,23 
and reinforce aspects of the Japanese justice system that favor prosecutorial 
power.  This is problematic in view of the Japanese government’s goal of 
creating a more liberal justice system for the twenty-first century with 
renewed focus on defendants’ rights.24  Furthermore, this comment argues 
that, contrary to beliefs among Japanese legal professionals, institutionalized 
plea bargaining would comport with the values of the Japanese justice 
system that emphasize truth-seeking, the defendant’s remorse and 
rehabilitation, and protection of victims’ interests.  In this regard, 
international criminal tribunals can serve as models for Japan because they 
utilize plea bargaining in ways that respect those objectives. 
Part II of this comment describes the increasing burdens on the 
Japanese criminal justice system and the tacit varieties of plea bargaining 
that have developed in response.  Part III argues that tacit bargaining cannot 
substitute for a more formalized system of plea bargaining.  Tacit bargaining 
                                           
19
  Id. at 191. 
20
  See Soldwedel, supra note 14, at 1434; J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Is the 
Japanese Conviction Rate So High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 57 (2001). 
21
  See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 773 (2001). 
22
  See Didrick Castberg, Prosecutorial Independence in Japan, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 38, 67-68 
(1997) (noting that one feature of formal American-style plea bargaining is an offer and exchange of 
specific benefits to both parties).  Standard-form plea bargaining, in which a defendant’s guilty plea is 
accompanied by standardized charge reductions or reductions in the prosecutor’s recommended length of 
sentence, renders negotiation more of a theoretical possibility than the norm in many jurisdictions in the 
United States.  See, e.g., Margareth Etienne & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Comment, Apologies and Plea 
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 295, 311 (2007) (analogizing plea bargaining to an “assembly line model of 
case processing in which prosecutors . . . assign a preliminary plea offer to each case”).  However, the laws 
of most jurisdictions leave the parties significant room for negotiation at the margins that take into account 
the unique circumstances of each case.  Id. at 312 (“Many plea agreements fall somewhere on the spectrum 
that runs from supermarket bargaining to protracted bargaining.”). 
23
  TURNER, supra note 16, at 192. 
24
  THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, THE POINTS AT ISSUE IN THE JUSTICE REFORM pt. I(1) 
(2001), http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/singikai/991221_e.html (noting that JSRC is charged 
with proposing reforms that recognize “plural viewpoints” of the justice system and that promote 
“fundamental human rights”). 
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exploits existing vulnerabilities in the Japanese justice system and often 
leads to uninformed, involuntary confessions. The nonbinding, 
nonnegotiable nature of tacit bargains also limits their effectiveness.  In 
contrast, a system of institutionalized plea bargaining would provide some 
protection for defendants’ rights. It would also level the playing field 
between the defense and prosecution by yielding enforceable plea 
agreements through a negotiated exchange of benefits.  Finally, Part IV 
posits that international criminal tribunals can serve as exemplars for Japan 
because they have used plea bargaining systematically and transparently in 
ways that incorporate the goals of the Japanese justice system. 
 
II.  INCREASING PRESSURE TO QUICKLY DISPOSE OF CRIMINAL CASES HAS 
LED JAPANESE PROSECUTORS TO USE TACIT BARGAINING  
  
Efficiency is the most often cited reason for the existence of plea 
bargaining,25 and recent trends highlight the demand for efficiency in Japan.  
Japan has been characterized as a “paradise lost” because of its once low 
crime rates compared to other industrialized nations, followed by a gradual 
increase in crime and decline in the public’s sense of security in the past two 
decades.26  During the 1960s through the 1980s, when the crime rates of 
most industrialized countries increased, Japan’s crime rate fell.27  However, 
this pattern reversed during the 1990s and the first decade of this century, as 
Japan experienced an economic downturn.28  Japan’s increasing crime rate 
has translated into a decreasing number of cases tried and prosecuted in the 
country,29 signaling that the current system is in need of a safety valve.  
Prosecutors have used tacit bargaining and the expedited trial procedures 
that follow to address the burdens on the system, but tacit bargaining is not 
an ideal solution to the problem of efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
                                           
25
  Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargaining as a Legal Transplant: A Good Idea for Troubled Criminal 
Justice Systems?, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 355, 392 (2010). 
26
  Dag Leonardsen, Crime in Japan: Paradise Lost?, 7 J. SCANDINAVIAN STUD. IN CRIMINOLOGY & 
CRIME PREVENTION 185, 185-86 (2006). 
27
  See Curtin, supra note 15. 
28
  Id.; see also Leonardsen, supra note 26, at 185 (concluding that the 1990s economic slump 
explains the rise in crime in Japan). 
29
  See 2006 WHITE PAPER ON CRIME, supra note 15, at tbl. 2-3-1-1. 
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A. Japan Is Experiencing an Upswing in Crime Rates and a Shortage of 
Prosecutorial Resources 
 
The increase in crime in Japan from the 1990s to the present has been 
significant.  One writer places the increase in the overall crime rate from 
1994 to 2004 at approximately 150%.30  The Japanese Ministry of Justice 
issued a White Paper on Crime in 2002 that showed a steady increase in the 
number of reported crimes since 1990. 31   There was an accompanying 
decrease in the clearance rate, the rate at which suspects are released from 
police custody or cleared of charges, for alleged violations of the Japanese 
Penal Code.32  Although recently issued White Papers indicate a decline in 
crime since 2003, crime is still high by historical standards33 and not all 
types of crime have decreased in frequency.34   Specifically, less serious 
nonviolent crimes, such as car thefts and burglaries, have seen the greatest 
rate increases in the past two decades.35  The increase in crime in Japan, 
particularly less serious crime, supports the argument in favor of plea 
bargaining because prosecutors are under pressure to dispose of each case 
quickly and turn their attention to other crimes.36  Less serious crimes are 
particularly amenable to plea bargaining because prosecutors may consider 
the seriousness of an offense and public response to a plea bargain when 
deciding whether to enter into plea discussions.37 
Although Japan’s rising crime rate and decreasing clearance rate 
demand more prosecutorial resources to keep the public safe, prosecutors’ 
offices remain “[c]hronically understaffed.”38  In 2006, according to United 
Nations estimates, there were fewer than two prosecutors in Japan for every 
                                           
30
  Curtin, supra note 15. But see David T. Johnson, Crime and Punishment in Contemporary Japan, 
36 CRIME & JUST. 371, 376-78 (2007) (arguing that the perception of a rise in crime has been fueled by 
changes in police crime reporting practices). 
31
  JAPANESE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER ON CRIME fig. 1-1-1-6 (2002),  available at 
http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/en/47/nfm/n_47_2_1_1_1_2.html (click link to “preface” in the index to see 
summary of report or click on links to individual sections). 
32
  Id. at fig. 1-1-1-1. 
33
  See Leonardsen, supra note 26; 2006 WHITE PAPER ON CRIME, supra note 15, at pt. 1, ch. 1, § 1.1. 
34
  Japan’s Crime Rate Soars, BBC NEWS, Aug. 3, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/1472175.stm. 
35
  Id. 
36
  See TURNER, supra note 16, at 174. 
37
  Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty”: Plea Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 131 (1997) (asserting that less serious and less visible crimes are most amenable to 
plea bargaining because prosecutors can avoid the public perception that they are being soft on crime by 
making a plea agreement). 
38
  Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 20, at 54. 
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100,000 people.39  Although the Japanese government plans to bring the 
number of lawyers nationwide up to at least 50,000 by 2018 with changes to 
bar admission rules made in 2002,40 the number of attorneys will remain low 
by international standards.41  Moreover, there is no guarantee that a sizable 
share of the new lawyers will choose to work as criminal lawyers when more 
attractive career paths are available.42  In addition to the small number of 
prosecutors, the number of trials has decreased quite steadily from 1996 to 
2005. 43   The fact that the number of trials cannot keep pace with the 
country’s crime rate shows that prosecutors need the kind of safety valve 
provided by plea bargaining.  The Japanese legislature’s introduction of a 
jury requirement for serious criminal cases beginning in 2009 has placed 
further limits on prosecutorial resources. 44   The jury trial requirement 
impacts roughly 3% of criminal cases each year and is a reality that 
prosecutors must confront by conserving resources whenever possible.45 
The public mood in Japan is not impervious to the nation’s increasing 
crime rate.  The sense of security that Japanese citizens once felt has 
gradually eroded, to the point that people fear for their personal safety.46  
The fear signals that “something new is happening in a society renowned for 
its peacefulness and high level of social integration.” 47   The public is 
distrustful of the ability of government authorities to clamp down on 
increasing crime rates.48  Perhaps these trends in the public mood indicate 
                                           
39
  U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, Questionnaire for the Tenth U.N. Survey of Crime Trends and 
Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, covering the period 2005-2006, at 956, 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/All_countries.pdf (listing 1.95 prosecutors in Japan per 
100,000 people). 
40
  Reforms in Japan Expected to Bring Influx of Lawyers, Lawsuits, INSURANCE JOURNAL (Aug. 21, 
2006), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2006/08/21/71561.htm (last visited April 25, 
2011); Number of Lawyers in Japan to Top 30,000 Soon, JAPAN TODAY, Dec. 22, 2010. 
41
  The United States had more than four times as many prosecutors as Japan (8.84) for every 100,000 
people in 2005, while still using plea bargaining on a regular basis to keep the court system running 
efficiently.  U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, supra note 39, at 2290. 
42
  Reforms in Japan Expected to Bring Influx of Lawyers, Lawsuits, supra note 40 (remarking that 
“[d]efense lawyers are widely perceived as protectors of the public’s enemies and are often poorly paid”). 
43
  See 2006 WHITE PAPER ON CRIME, supra note 15, at tbl. 2-3-1-1(tracking a relatively steady 
decline from 1996 to 2005 in the number of defendants that are finally judged by trials).  
44
  See Matthew J. Wilson, U.S. Legal Education Methods and Ideals: Application to the Japanese 
and Korean Systems, 18 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 295, 334 (2010) (explaining that Japanese courts 
had to appoint defense attorneys in 6730 cases that were filed in the month following implementation of the 
new jury trial system). 
45
  Matthew Wilson, The Dawn of Criminal Jury Trials in Japan: Success on the Horizon?, 24 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 835, 844-45 (2007) (listing types of cases in which new mixed jury system is required and 
calculating that 3.2% of cases would have been subject to the requirement in 2005). 
46
  See Leonardsen, supra note 26, at 186 (describing fear that Japanese parents and teachers have 
about youth and a rising preoccupation with media coverage of crime). 
47
  Id. at 187. 
48
  See Curtin, supra note 15 (finding that public confidence in the police has hit a record low). 
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that the Japanese citizenry is ready for the government to try more efficient 
methods of prosecuting crime and getting criminals off the streets.  Indeed, 
one of the findings of the JSRC was that the public doubted the 
government’s ability to quickly try and sentence criminal defendants.49  Plea 
bargaining could be an effective tool in the government’s arsenal for 
achieving speedier criminal justice. 
 
B. Japanese Prosecutors Have Used Tacit Bargaining in Response to the 
Pressures to Expedite Criminal Proceedings 
 
The trends noted above illustrate that efficiency is now a core concern 
of the Japanese criminal justice system, creating the need for a system of 
plea bargaining.  Japanese prosecutors, encouraged by trial courts, have 
responded to the demand for efficiency by using various forms of informal 
tacit bargaining.50  In her survey of plea bargaining systems across the globe, 
Jenia Turner identifies three types of tacit bargaining that are used in Japan:  
1) an informal offer of summary prosecution and a monetary fine rather than 
a custodial sentence, in exchange for a confession; 2) an informal offer of 
suspended prosecution or recommendation of a lenient sentence, in 
exchange for a confession; and 3) an unspoken exchange of a lighter 
sentence for confession and cooperation with the court.51 
Summary prosecution, in which no formal trial occurs, is the primary 
mode of resolution used in minor criminal cases and traffic offenses.52  More 
serious cases, however, must be resolved by a full-scale trial or by the 
expedited trials allowed by the second and third type of tacit bargains.53  All 
three categories of tacit bargaining identified by Turner rest on the 
defendant’s confession.54  The implicit bargain (i.e. the promise of a more 
lenient sentence or of suspended prosecution) is offered in exchange for the 
defendant’s confession, and this exchange of benefits occurs during pretrial 
interrogation before the defendant is formally charged and pleads in court.55  
As one writer explains,  
In Japan, there is no guilty plea as such, as the accused can only 
admit or deny the facts as set forth in the indictment.  And by 
                                           
49
  THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 10, at ch. II, pt. 2, § 1. 
50
  TURNER, supra note 16, at 174, 191. 
51
  Id. at 189, 191. 
52
  See 2006 WHITE PAPER ON CRIME, supra note 15, at tbl. 2-3-1-3; Johnson, supra note 13, at 414. 
53
  TURNER, supra note 16, at 191. 
54
  Id. 
55
  Id. 
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the time the indictment is filed, the defendant has generally 
given a statement in which he or she confesses or admits to 
most of the facts charged.  Thus the defendant in Japan has little 
with which to bargain.56 
In contrast, in the Anglo-American system, the bargain is offered in 
exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea, and the terms of the bargain are 
reduced to writing before the defendant appears in court.  The system of 
confession-dependent tacit bargaining and the system of plea-dependent 
institutionalized bargaining differ in important respects. 
 
C.  Japanese Prosecutors Rely on Tacit Bargaining Because of Cultural 
Aversion to Institutionalized Plea Bargaining 
 
Tacit bargaining can be viewed as a way of getting around the 
ingrained cultural aversion to “explicit” plea bargaining within the Japanese 
legal community.57  Japan’s cultural distaste for plea bargaining stems from 
the fact that the country’s justice system is not centered on defendants’ 
rights, or what some scholars call “procedural justice.”58  Rather, it focuses 
on achieving the “just result,” or what some scholars call “substantive 
justice.”59  There are three goals of the Japanese justice system that lead the 
way to the “just result”:  seeking a truthful account of events, exacting 
remorse from defendants while attempting to rehabilitate them, and 
protecting victims.60  Many Japanese legal professionals believe that plea 
bargaining interferes with these goals because “the advance promise of 
leniency” pressures innocent defendants to plead guilty and induces guilty 
defendants to distort the truth.61  They believe that the pressure to falsify 
undermines the search for truth. 62   They also believe that, whereas a 
confession reveals the motives behind a defendant’s crime, a guilty plea 
precludes a sincere apology from the defendant, diminishes the prospects for 
genuine rehabilitation, and interferes with the victim’s healing process.63 
                                           
56
  Castberg, supra note 22, at 68. 
57
  See TURNER, supra note 16, at 191, 195. 
58
  Desombre, supra note 9, at 103; Soldwedel, supra note 14, at 1430. 
59
  Id. 
60
  See Desombre, supra note 9, at 124 (noting the truth-seeking component of the Japanese justice 
system); Weber, supra note 14, at 146-47 (noting the Japanese justice system’s commitment to the goals of 
rehabilitation and remorse); Soldwedel, supra note 14, at 1458-59 (noting that, as crimes have increased, 
the Japanese justice system has become increasingly focused on protecting victims’ rights rather than the 
rights of the accused). 
61
  Desombre, supra note 9, at 124. 
62
  Id. 
63
  Weber, supra note 14, at 146-47. 
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To get around cultural obstacles to institutionalized plea bargaining, 
Japanese legal professionals use tacit bargaining.  However, tacit bargaining 
is concerning in regards to defendants’ rights, as covered in Part III.  The use 
of plea bargaining in international criminal tribunals, as covered in Part IV, 
indicates that institutionalized plea bargaining may actually be a better fit for 
the values of the Japanese justice system. 
III.  THE NONBINDING, COERCIVE NATURE OF TACIT BARGAINS MAKE THEM 
INADEQUATE SUBSTITUTES FOR FORMAL PLEA AGREEMENTS 
Formal institutionalized plea bargaining has been the object of much 
criticism,64 raising the question of whether Japan would be better served by 
continuing to use the tacit bargaining system that preserves at least some 
semblance of trial procedures. 65   There is voluminous literature that 
criticizes the quality of justice that results from institutionalized plea 
bargaining.66  A common thread in this literature is that plea bargaining 
subverts the integrity of the judicial system because the defendant gives up 
the safeguards of trial, such as judicial neutrality and the public forum.67  
Plea bargaining is also criticized for its coerciveness; it pressures defendants 
into waiving their right to a trial and punishes defendants who insist on trial 
with harsher sentences. 68   Finally, some believe that plea bargaining 
pressures innocent defendants who don’t want to accept the risks associated 
with trial into pleading guilty, thereby undermining the truth finding function 
of trial.69  The main response to these arguments usually hinges on the sheer 
necessity of plea bargaining in overburdened criminal justice systems. 70  
                                           
64
  See Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International 
Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 n.13 (2002) (listing several articles that are critical of plea bargaining).   
65
  Summary prosecution, often used to resolve minor crimes, avoids trial, but the types of tacit 
bargaining generally used to resolve more serious cases preserve an expedited form of trial.  See TURNER, 
supra note 16, at 191; Johnson, supra note 13, at 414. 
66
  See generally Combs, supra note 64. 
67
  See Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 40-41 (1983); Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-
Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 
1361, 1368-69 (2003). 
68
  See, e.g., Timothy Lynch, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, 26 REGULATION 24, 27 (2003), 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv26n3/v26n3-7.pdf; Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 
357, 363 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Desombre, supra note 9, at 119. 
69
  See Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment, Should We Really “Ban” Plea Bargaining? The Core 
Concerns of Plea Bargaining’s Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 768 (1998); Michael W. Smith, Making the 
Innocent Guilty: Plea Bargaining and the False Plea Convictions of the Innocent, 46(5) CRIM. LAW 
BULLETIN ART 4, 14 (2010). 
70
  See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (“If every criminal charge were 
subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times 
the number of judges and court facilities.”). 
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Plea bargaining is viewed as an essential time saver71 because it shortcuts 
complicated trial procedures while still affording defendants some measure 
of choice in deciding whether to “‘sell’ [their] right to trial.”72 
The increasing crime rates and shortage of prosecutorial resources in 
Japan highlight the necessity for a plea bargaining system in the country.73  
Thus, while it is beyond the scope of this comment to embark on an in-depth 
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of plea bargaining, this 
comment does adopt the stance that plea bargaining, for all its flaws, is a 
valuable feature in overburdened court systems.  Furthermore, this comment 
argues that, compared to institutionalized plea bargaining, the problems 
associated with tacit plea bargaining are more numerous and more restrictive 
of defendants’ rights. 
At about the same time that crime started increasing in Japan in the 
1990s, the country’s legal system also began undergoing a major transition, 
formally shifting from an inquisitorial system to an adversarial system.74  
Many of the reform laws passed by the Japanese legislature following the 
JSRC recommendations were intended to introduce an adversarial 
component into Japan’s criminal justice system.75  However, vestiges of the 
old inquisitorial system remain.76  The principle aim of the Japanese justice 
system is still “to achieve the just result, not the just process,” so that “if the 
accused is indeed guilty, the Japanese system is driven to find him guilty 
even if his rights are violated in the process of determining his guilt.”77  Tacit 
plea bargaining, which rests on obtaining confessions, reinforces coercive 
institutional structures and relationships within the Japanese system in a way 
that is concerning for the rights of criminal defendants.  Institutionalized 
plea bargaining would result in fewer uninformed, involuntary confessions 
in Japan.  A system of formal plea agreements would also introduce more 
balance into Japan’s criminal justice process and into the relationships of key 
players in the Japanese legal system.  It would do so by fostering binding 
                                           
71
  Fisher, supra note 3, at 1070. 
72
  Sandefur, supra note 6. 
73
  See supra Part II. 
74
  Tom Ginsburg, Review: Untitled, 30 J. JAPANESE STUD. 572, 573 (2004) (reviewing THE 
JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES AND COMPARISONS (Malcolm M. Feeley & 
Setsuo Miyazawa eds., 2002)). 
75
  See Foote, supra note 12, at 11-12 (describing reform laws, such as the strengthening of public 
defender agencies and introduction of ADR mechanisms, that have attempted to equalize the power of the 
defense and prosecution). 
76
  See Ginsburg, supra note 74, at 573 (noting that many authors have concluded that Japan has not 
met its stated objective of fully transitioning to an adversarial system). 
77
  Desombre, supra note 9, at 103. 
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plea agreements through a negotiated exchange of benefits and setting up 
structures that are protective of defendants’ rights. 
 
A. Tacit Bargaining Depends on Confessions Obtained Under Coercive 
Conditions Where the Defendant’s Access to Counsel Is Restricted 
 
Despite Japan’s transition to a primarily adversarial legal system, the 
balance of power is still skewed in the prosecution’s favor, particularly 
during the pretrial stage.  Prosecutors focus on obtaining confessions prior to 
trial, 78  and tacit bargaining relies on the defendant’s confession.  
Accordingly, the practice of tacit bargaining exploits the coercive conditions 
that exist at the pretrial stage due to the lack of procedural safeguards in the 
Japanese justice system.  Confessions are considered to be the “‘king of 
evidence’”79 and form the basis for a conviction in over 90% of criminal 
cases in Japan,80 so the connection between tacit bargaining and coercive 
institutional structures raises concern in many cases.  American-style 
institutionalized plea bargaining can help equalize the power of the defense 
and prosecution by affording defendants greater institutional safeguards 
when they decide whether to accept a plea agreement. 
 
1. Confessions Are Often Obtained in Japan Under Coercive Conditions  
 
Coercive interrogation practices are linked to the high frequency of 
confessions in Japan.81  There is a 93% confession rate82 and a conviction 
rate over 99% in Japan.83  In addition to virtually ensuring conviction at trial, 
confessions are viewed as “a first step on the road to rehabilitation,”84 an 
important goal of the country’s justice system.  In fact, confession takes 
precedence in criminal prosecutions over other important factual and legal 
issues that should be examined to preserve the presumption of innocence, 
                                           
78
  Matthew J. Wilson, Japan’s New Criminal Jury Trial System: In Need of More Transparency, 
More Access, and More Time, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 487, 504-05 (2010). 
79
  Norimitsu Onishi, Pressed by Police, Even Innocent Confess in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2007, 
at A1 (quoting Japanese attorney and former judge Kenzo Akiyama). 
80
  Wilson, supra note 78, at 508-09. 
81
  Ginsburg, supra note 74, at 574 (acknowledging that “the frequency of confession is no doubt tied 
to interrogation practices”). 
82
  See Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 20, at 57. 
83
  Wilson, supra note 78, at 508.  Note that the confession and conviction rates can differ because the 
Japanese Constitution requires independent evidentiary corroboration of a defendant’s confession in order 
to convict.  See KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION], art. 38, para. 3 (Japan). 
84
  Erik D. Herber, Japanese Sentencing Practices: Creating an Opportunity for Formal 
“Paternalism,” 2 INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY & SOC. THEORY 303, 306 (2009), available at 
http://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/ijcst/article/viewFile/23406/21602. 
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such as analysis of forensic evidence. 85   In light of the importance of 
confession to the legal system, there is a great deal of pressure on police and 
prosecutors to obtain confessions from defendants. 86   While there are 
analogous pressures to obtain guilty pleas in the Anglo-American system, 
the pressures used to secure confessions are more acute in Japan for two 
reasons.  First, Japanese prosecutors have greater discretion than their 
American counterparts during the pretrial interrogation period.87  Second, a 
defendant’s access to counsel is restricted during the pretrial period in Japan, 
making interrogation a more isolating, coercive experience in Japan than in 
the American system.88 
Japanese police and prosecutors employ a variety of methods to 
extract confessions within the coercive interrogation environment.89  Once 
arrested, defendants can be held in police custody for up to twenty-three 
days and questioned during that period before they are indicted.90  This 
period can be extended with court approval when the suspect faces charges 
for multiple crimes,91  which is often true in cases that are amenable to 
bargaining.92  Article 198(1) of the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure 
places suspects under a duty to appear at interrogation, 93  and although 
suspects may refuse to answer questions, they cannot cut off questioning and 
are therefore susceptible to coercive interrogation techniques.94  Authorities 
may resort to threats or psychological torture to extract a confession from an 
                                           
85
  Stephan Landsman & Jing Zhang, A Tale of Two Juries: Lay Participation Comes to Japanese 
and Chinese Courts, 25 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 179, 184 (2008). 
86
  See John O. Haley, A Spiral of Success: Community Support is Key to Restorative Justice in 
Japan, 38 ECOLOGY JUST. 2, 2 (1994), available at http://www.context.org/ICLIB/IC38/Haley.htm. 
87
  Id. (noting that “discretionary powers . . . make official restorative measures possible.”). 
88
  See Wilson, supra note 78, at 505; but see JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, JAPAN FEDERATION OF 
BAR ASSOCIATIONS UPDATE REPORT IN RESPONSE TO THE LIST OF ISSUES TO BE TAKEN UP IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE CONSIDERATION OF THE FIFTH PERIODIC REPORT OF JAPAN 11 (2008), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/JFBA_Japan94.pdf [hereinafter “JAPAN FED’N OF BAR 
ASS’NS”]; JAPAN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL SUPPORT BY THE 
JAPAN LEGAL SUPPORT CENTER (2006), available at http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/issues/issues02.html 
(describing 2004 Comprehensive Legal Support Law that has expanded pre-trial access to counsel for 
defendants in some types of criminal cases since 2006) . 
89
  Wilson, supra note 78, at 509. 
90
  Robert M. Bloom, Jury Trials in Japan 27 (Boston College Law School Faculty Papers, Working 
Paper No. 41, 2005), available at 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context=lsfp. 
91
  Wilson, supra note 78, at 504 n.116. 
92
  Craig Albee, Note, Multiple Punishment in Wisconsin and the Wolske Decision: Is it Desirable to 
Permit Two Homicide Convictions For Causing a Single Death?, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 553, 572 (1990) 
(noting that “a defendant facing the prospect of conviction on a number of charges is more likely to be 
compelled to plead guilty for plea bargaining purposes, regardless of his actual guilt”). 
93
  See KEISOHŌ [C. CRIM. PRO.] art. 198, para. 1 (Japan). 
94
  See Desombre, supra note 9, at 109-10. 
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uncooperative defendant. 95   Such abuses occur despite constitutional 
prohibitions against compelled testimony.96  In the infamous 1991 wrongful 
conviction case of Toshikazu Sugaya, who was charged with kidnapping and 
murdering a four-year-old girl but ultimately acquitted after spending 
seventeen years in jail, interrogators questioned Sugaya for thirteen 
consecutive hours without access to counsel.97  The public rarely learns of 
such interrogation abuses because interrogations occur incommunicado; they 
are not fully recorded, and prosecutors sometimes cherry pick which 
portions of recordings to make available to the court.98 
While the American system is not immune from these kinds of abuses, 
the kind of institutionalized plea bargaining that is prevalent in America 
could reduce the coerciveness of Japan’s pretrial processes.  Japanese 
authorities implicitly recognize this, citing the lack of a formal plea 
bargaining as a justification for their use of harsh interrogation methods.99  
Because plea bargaining, unlike most forms of tacit bargaining, eliminates 
the trial stage, the main event of the criminal justice process in a plea 
bargaining system is the process of pretrial plea negotiations.100  Both parties 
bring all their bargaining chips to the plea discussions and must abide by the 
plea agreement that is reached; as discussed in greater detail below, the 
defendant can withdraw a guilty plea if the prosecutor reneges on the deal.101  
The binding nature of the plea agreement gives the prosecutor incentive to 
engage defense counsel at each step of the negotiations and develop a 
mutually amicable agreement.  This kind of negotiating environment 
facilitates “openness and candor” 102  between the parties during the 
bargaining process.  It can permit more transparent negotiations and yield 
fairer deals that will withstand the test of time. 
In contrast, in Japan’s tacit bargaining system, prosecutors often do 
not deal with defense counsel prior to trial.  Rather, they interrogate the 
unrepresented defendant alone, setting up a one-sided situation where 
prosecutors are prone to use coercive techniques to secure confessions.  One 
of these techniques may be to offer a tacit bargain but leave little or no room 
                                           
95
  Wilson, supra note 78, at 509. 
96
  KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION], art. 38, para. 2 (Japan). 
97
  See Martin Fackler, Falsely Convicted, Freed and No Longer Quiet, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010. 
98
  See Prosecutors to Partially Record Interrogations, JAPAN TODAY, Dec. 8, 2010, 
http://www.japantoday.com/category/crime/view/prosecutors-to-partially-record-interrogations (last visited 
April 27, 2011). 
99
  Wilson, supra note 78, at 509. 
100
  Adam Robison, Comment, Waiver of Plea Agreement Statements: A Glimmer of Hope to Limit 
Plea Statement Usage to Impeachment, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 671 (2005). 
101
  Damaška, supra note 2, at 1027. 
102
  Robison, supra note 100. 
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for negotiation or modifications to the initial offer. With the full force of the 
prosecutorial system bearing down upon them, Japanese defendants may 
confess because they feel like they have “little with which to bargain.”103  
The lack of access to defense counsel for many Japanese defendants means 
that there is no one to counterbalance the prosecutor’s apparent power 
during the tacit bargaining stage.  In sum, in contrast to their American 
counterparts, Japanese prosecutors in the tacit bargaining system work 
within an isolating, coercive environment where defendants are likely to 
confess even if doing so is against their best interests. 
 
2. Access to Counsel Prior to Confession Is Restricted in the Japanese 
Justice System 
 
In Japan, parties usually agree to tacit bargains during interrogation 
without the presence of defense counsel.104  In most cases, the exchange of 
the tacit bargain for the defendant’s confession occurs prior to pleading 
guilty or not guilty. 105   When defendants gain access to counsel after 
indictment, they may recant their confessions and plead not guilty, but this 
does not prevent the courts from using the original confession as 
incriminating evidence. 106   Thus, tacit bargains, once struck during the 
interrogation period, can do real damage to a defendant’s case, and it is 
important for a defendant to consult with counsel before confessing.  Until 
recent amendments to Japan’s Criminal Procedure Code in 2004,107 a suspect 
had no right to request the presence of an attorney during the pre-indictment 
interrogation period or to stop the interrogation midway to consult with an 
attorney.108 
In 2004, the Japanese legislature amended the Code of Criminal 
Procedure to provide access to state-appointed counsel for indigent 
defendants before indictment.109  The amendment went into effect in two 
phases.110  In the first phase, effective in October 2006, the new system of 
state-appointed counsel was extended to cases that are punishable by death 
                                           
103
  Castberg, supra note 22. 
104
  See Wilson, supra note 78, at 505 (noting that traditionally, state-appointed counsel has been 
unavailable to defendants until after indictment). 
105
  TURNER, supra note 16, at 192. 
106
  See Wilson, supra note 78, at 500 (explaining that Toshikazu Sugaya, in his 1991 murder trial, 
recanted his confession after gaining access to counsel because the confession was given under the duress, 
but the trial court proceeded to convict him based on his confession). 
107
  See JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, supra note 88; KEISOHŌ [C. CRIM. PRO.] arts. 32, 36 (Japan). 
108
  Wilson, supra note 78, at 505. 
109
  See JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, supra note 88; KEISOHŌ [C. CRIM. PRO.] art. 32 (Japan). 
110
  JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, supra note 88. 
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or by life imprisonment or a minimum term of not less than one year.111  In 
2009, the system was extended also to any crimes that have a maximum 
term of more than three years.112 
Yet, even these amendments do not ensure that every defendant has 
access to counsel prior to confession.  The Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs claims that the system covers 80% of criminal cases.113  This leaves 
out the other 20% of cases, which are usually minor crimes that may be most 
amenable to plea bargaining.114  Accordingly, the Japan Federation of Bar 
Associations (JFBA) has declared that the new system is “far from 
international standards.” 115   Despite the 2004 amendment, under Article 
39(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor still retains 
discretion to determine the time, duration, and location of suspect-counsel 
meetings prior to indictment.116  These restrictions on the availability of 
counsel set up a situation where the defendant may not fully appreciate the 
benefits and drawbacks of confession or of accepting a tacit offer of leniency 
from the prosecutor. 
Because the Japanese Constitution, like the United States 
Constitution, guarantees criminal defendants the right to a trial,117 a formal 
waiver of this constitutional right through plea bargaining would likely 
require special safeguards, particularly the right to counsel.  In Japan, with 
the exception of traffic infractions and other minor offenses, trial is 
preserved when the defendant confesses to a crime pursuant to a tacit 
bargain.118  In the American system, when a defendant chooses to plead 
guilty and forego a trial, the defendant’s rights are protected by a plea 
colloquy or hearing.119  The United States Supreme Court has explained that 
“[t]he purpose of a plea colloquy is to protect the defendant from an 
unintelligent or involuntary plea.”120  During a colloquy, the trial court must 
explain to defendants that they have the right to a jury trial and the right 
against self-incrimination at the trial and are foregoing those rights by 
                                           
111
  Id. 
112
  Id. 
113
  MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, NATIONAL REPORT BY JAPAN FOR THE UNIVERSAL 
PERIODIC REVIEW 8 (2008), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human/report0803.pdf. 
114
  See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 37. 
115
  JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, supra note 88. 
116
  Desombre, supra note 9, at 113; KEISOHŌ [C. CRIM. PRO.] art. 39, para. 3 (Japan). 
117
  Compare U.S. CONST., amend. VI, with KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION], art. 37 (Japan). 
118
  Johnson, supra note 13, at 414 (writing that traffic infractions and minor offenses are handled by 
summary procedure without a trial). 
119
  Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 323 (1999). 
120
  Id. at 322. 
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pleading guilty.121  Defendants have the right to be represented by counsel 
during the plea hearing. 122   Thus, even for defendants who make 
incriminating statements during pretrial interrogation, the plea colloquy 
gives those defendants a second chance to weigh their options and decide 
whether to plead guilty after consulation with counsel.   
There is no analogue to the plea colloquy in the Japanese system since 
defendants charged with serious crimes must go through the motions of a 
trial even after confessing pursuant to a tacit bargain.123  If Japan were to 
adopt a system of institutionalized plea bargaining, in which bargaining 
shortcuts the trial stage of a case, it is likely that some analogue to the plea 
colloquy would be necessary to formalize and regularize guilty pleas.  
Accordingly, Japanese defendants would have access to counsel at their plea 
hearing before waiving the right to trial.  In turn, increased access to defense 
counsel in Japan’s criminal justice system would result in fewer involuntary 
and uninformed admissions of guilt as a basis of conviction. 
 
B. Tacit Bargaining Reinforces Close Judge-Prosecutor Relationships 
and a Deferential Culture Among Defense Attorneys in Japan  
 
Part I of this comment described the relatively small number of 
lawyers in Japan compared to the United States.124  The small size of the 
Japanese bar and the country’s rising crime rates highlight the need for plea 
bargaining as a tool of efficiency.125  More important than the number of 
attorneys in Japan, however, are the relationships among legal professionals.  
These relationships suggest that institutionalized plea bargaining is a better 
fit for Japan than tacit plea bargaining. 
Because of prosecutorial privileges before and during trial, there 
exists a deferential and cooperative culture among Japanese defense 
attorneys.126  Before trial, defense lawyers often do not even recommend that 
their clients exercise their right to silence.127  In spite of the new system of 
state-appointed counsel prior to indictment, defense attorneys are already 
accustomed to deferring to the investigative practices of police and 
                                           
121
  Id. at 323. 
122
  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). 
123
  Johnson, supra note 13, at 414 (distinguishing between contested and uncontested forms of trial in 
Japan). 
124
  See supra Part I. 
125
  See id. 
126
  Johnson, supra note 13, at 214. 
127
  Id. 
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prosecutors. 128   Because of their traditional deferential relationship with 
prosecutors, defense attorneys often advise their clients to confess.129  The 
fact that tacit bargains are nonnegotiable and unenforceable reinforces this 
deferential culture because the defense has little power at the bargaining 
table and may see no other choice but to accept the prosecutor’s offer. 
During trial, the prosecution retains its advantage because any 
evidence obtained during interrogation, including a confession, becomes part 
of the dossier that is presented to the trial court.130  A dossier is a written 
account of the evidence drafted by the prosecutor.131  A dossier is not an 
objective account of the evidence but a summary of the evidence obtained 
during pretrial investigation written from the prosecutor’s perspective.  
Nonetheless, judges are quick to use the dossier both in evaluating the 
defendant’s guilt and in sentencing.132  Defense attorneys rarely object to 
dossier evidence at trial because reliance on the dossier is a “custom based 
on years of tradition.”133  Courts have come to depend so much on the 
dossier that one former judge had this to say: 
[I]n their current state, criminal trials—and in particular the 
fact-finding that lies at the heart of trials—are conducted in 
closed rooms by the investigators, and the proceedings in open 
court are merely a formal ceremony.  In a word, [reliance on the 
dossier] is the turning of public trials into an empty shell.134 
The reliance on the dossier stems from the deep relationship of trust between 
the judge and the prosecutor, a vestige of the old inquisitorial system.135  
Although the introduction of jury trials since 2009 has reduced reliance on 
dossier evidence, 136  the jury requirement does not extend to the large 
majority of cases. 137   Moreover, the introduction of jury trials does not 
impact pretrial interrogation practices.  Ultimately, therefore, defense 
attorneys and their clients occupy a weaker position relative to the 
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  See id. at 214, 217. 
129
  Id.  
130
  Susan Maslen, Japan & The Rule of Law, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 281, 290 (1998). 
131
  Id. 
132
  Id. 
133
  See id. (stating that trial by dossier is an “acceptable phenomenon” among key players in the 
justice system). 
134
  Id. (quoting Takeo Ishimatsu, Are Criminal Defendants in Japan Truly Receiving Trial by Judge?, 
22 UNIV. OF TŌKYŌ: AN ANNUAL 143, 143 (1989)). 
135
  Ginsburg, supra note 74, at 573. 
136
  Takashi Maruta, The Criminal Jury Trial in Imperial Japan and the Contemporary Argument for 
Its Reintroduction, 72 INT’L REV. PENAL L. 216, 224 (2001).  
137
  See Wilson, supra note 45 (calculating that the jury requirement would only impact about 3% of 
criminal cases in Japan each year). 
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prosecution.  Institutionalized plea bargaining could introduce more balance 
between the parties by yielding a negotiated exchange of benefits and 
binding, enforceable plea agreements.  In such a system, defense attorneys 
would form one-half of the negotiation process, on an equal ground with the 
other half, the prosecutor.  Emphasizing the importance of defense counsel 
to the plea bargaining process, a former American judge has called the 
defense attorney the “‘equalizer’ in the bargaining process.”138  In a system 
of formal plea agreements, defense attorneys would need to take 
responsibility for the bargains that will determine the evolution of their 
clients’ cases. 
 
1. Tacit Bargains Lack Formal Enforcement Mechanisms If the 
Prosecutor Breaches and Are Not Formed by a Negotiated Exchange 
of Benefits 
 
The usefulness of tacit bargains for relieving burdens on Japan’s court 
system is diminished by the fact that such bargains are nonbinding and 
unenforceable if the prosecutor breaches the agreement.  Japanese 
prosecutors may suspend prosecution on a particular charge, may 
recommend a lenient sentence, and may do something else that is the subject 
of an implicit bargain, but they need not do so.139  The tacit agreement does 
not appear on the record.140   This leaves the defendant without a legal 
remedy if the prosecutor reneges on the implicit deal.141   In contrast, a 
formal plea bargain is a written agreement signed by both parties and is 
enforceable as a contract once approved by the court.142 
The written record of the plea agreement is useful if the prosecutor 
reneges on the deal, prompting the defendant to seek enforcement of the 
agreement. 143   American courts apply principles of contract law to the 
                                           
138
  Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1179 
(1975) (quoting Judge J. Skelly Wright in The New Role of Defense Counsel Under Escobedo and Miranda, 
52 A.B.A. J. 1117, 1120 (1966)). 
139
  TURNER, supra note 16, at 191-92. 
140
  Id. 
141
  Id. at 192. 
142
  See United States v. A-Abras Inc., 185 F.3d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that the parties used a 
written plea agreement); United States v. Johnston, 199 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that “plea 
agreements are typically construed according to the principles of contract law”); Pannarale v. State, 638 
N.E.2d 1247, 1248 (Ind. 1994) (noting that pleas are “contractual in nature, binding the defendant, the state 
and the trial court”). 
143
  Colquitt, supra note 21, at 747 (stating that a written plea agreement is useful in the event of an 
appeal or other type of collateral proceeding). 
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enforcement of plea agreements.144  For example, in an appropriate case, the 
defendant may be entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement.145  
Conversely, prosecutors in Japan are keenly aware that they can change their 
minds about tacit bargains.146  While it is true that prosecutors normally 
abide by the terms of tacit agreements to encourage other defendants to 
confess in the future,147 the lack of a record and enforcement remedies leave 
the prosecutor with discretion as to whether to honor the agreement.  This 
creates a scenario that is very different from formal plea bargaining:  
“defendants are not bargaining—instead, they are essentially throwing 
themselves at the mercy of the authorities, who ultimately decide whether to 
honor [the] ‘deal.’”148   Even though prosecutors in the Japanese system 
usually honor informal deals because of the impact of repudiation on future 
cases, individual defendants may hesitate to confess and enter into implicit 
deals in the absence of formal enforcement mechanisms.  This could lead to 
fewer tacit agreements, undermining the ultimate goal of bargaining, which 
is to reduce burdens on trial courts. 
The prosecutor’s ability to renege on an informal deal makes the terms 
and finality of the deal less predictable than is the case with institutionalized 
plea bargaining.  Tacit bargains benefit the prosecution by triggering less 
time-consuming court proceedings, and they benefit the defendant by saving 
time, litigation costs, and perhaps a harsher sentence or heightened 
charges. 149   Japanese prosecutors, however, have less flexibility in 
negotiating tacit bargains than their counterparts in a formal plea bargaining 
system.  For example, they usually cannot offer the defendant more than pre-
determined, standard sentence reductions as a “reward” for confession.150  In 
contrast, prosecutors engaged in formal plea bargaining can generally 
consider all of the mitigating circumstances of a case and develop an 
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appropriate deal.151  Thus, tacit bargaining is not a negotiation similar to the 
kind that occurs in American-style plea bargaining, where the prosecutor 
comes to the bargaining table with flexibility and a range of benefits to 
offer.152  The benefits afforded by tacit plea bargaining are much narrower 
and less predictable. 
 
IV.  THE USE OF FORMAL PLEA BARGAINING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS ADDRESSES JAPAN’S CULTURAL AVERSION TO PLEA 
BARGAINING 
 
In spite of the tacit negotiations that are common within the Japanese 
criminal justice system, there is an enduring cultural distaste for plea 
bargaining among Japanese legal professionals, so much so that the practice 
is referred to as “evil.”153  Therefore, any argument that Japan should adopt a 
system of institutionalized plea bargaining must address the deep-rooted 
cultural aversion to the practice.  As discussed above, many Japanese legal 
professionals believe that plea bargaining is incompatible with the central 
values of the Japanese justice system:  seeking the truth, ensuring the 
defendant’s remorse and rehabilitation, and protecting victims’ interests.  
The use of plea bargaining in international criminal tribunals is important in 
this regard because these tribunals share the goals of the Japanese justice 
system and have used plea bargaining in ways that respect these goals. 
International criminal tribunals have reconciled competing cultural 
viewpoints on plea bargaining and pragmatically opted for an open, 
systematic use of the practice in order to manage increasing case loads and 
complex cases. 154   The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) are 
among the international tribunals that permit plea bargaining.155  The use of 
plea bargaining in international tribunals is particularly controversial 
because of the serious nature of the crimes involved, the duty of 
international courts to prosecute these crimes and issue proportionate 
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sentences, and the need to create a sufficient historical record of cases for 
posterity.156  Because of the unique functions of international courts and the 
serious nature of international crimes, the goals that are central to the 
Japanese justice system are also central to international courts. 157  
International tribunals have managed to reconcile plea bargaining with the 
important objectives of truth seeking, the defendant’s remorse and 
rehabilitation, and victim protection. 
 
A.  International Tribunals Have Used Procedural Rules to Reconcile 
Plea Bargaining and the Pursuit of Truth 
 
 As with Japanese courts, truth seeking is a priority of international 
criminal tribunals because of the tribunals’ duty to develop an accurate 
historical record of cases for the future and see to it that “less information is 
lost in the catacombs of the past.”158  Full-blown trials yield a record of the 
facts of a case through evidentiary production and witness testimony, and 
there is concern that plea bargaining hinders the truth-finding function by 
shortcutting this process.159  The ICTY case of Prosecutor v. Plavšić, relating 
to the conflict in Bosnia during the 1990s, is one of the first international 
plea-bargained cases and provides an example of how plea bargaining may 
actually aid the truth-finding function of courts.160 
The defendant in that case, Biljana Plavšić, was the president of 
Republika Srpska during the Bosnian conflict.161  In 2001, she voluntarily 
surrendered to the ICTY and was charged with two counts of genocide and 
complicity in genocide and six counts of crimes against humanity.162  In 
exchange for a plea of guilty to persecution (one count among the charges 
for crimes against humanity), the prosecutor agreed to drop the other charges 
and recommend a light sentence.163  The court approved the agreement, and 
Plavšić was eventually sentenced to just eleven years in a “posh” Swedish 
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prison complex.164  Significantly, along with her guilty plea, Plavšić was 
required by the ICTY Trial Chamber to provide a five-page statement in 
which she detailed the circumstances of her crime of persecution.165  The 
prosecution and defense teams agreed that Plavšić’s statement would quell 
revisionist accounts of the crime, aiding the Trial Chamber’s truth-finding 
function.166  Both sides also defended the plea bargain by noting that a trial 
would be followed by debate about the accuracy and quality of evidence 
presented, but debate is minimal when the defendant details the 
circumstances of the crime.167 
Beyond the statement requirement, other procedural rules of 
international criminal tribunals also tailor plea bargaining to suit the truth-
finding function of the tribunals.  For example, the ICC’s Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence provide that the court may order a “more complete 
presentation of the alleged facts” if it believes that the “interests of justice 
require it.”168  This language is broad enough to give the court discretion to 
reject a plea bargain if it believes that the record indicates that the defendant 
is actually innocent or that the crime is one for which a full trial is necessary 
to build an accurate historical record.  Article 65 of the statute creating the 
ICC also notes that the “admission of guilt [must be] supported by the facts 
of the case.”169  This case-by-case approach to plea bargaining allows the 
international courts to reconcile the practice with its duty to discover the 
truth.  Japan can adapt institutionalized plea bargaining to the truth-seeking 
goal of its justice system by adopting similar methods:  requiring defendants 
to make detailed statements accompanying their guilty pleas and adopting 
procedural rules that grant the court discretion in determining whether to 
approve a plea agreement.  
  
B.  Self-Condemnatory Plea Bargaining Mechanisms Will Promote 
Defendants’ Remorse and Rehabilitation  
 
Given the serious nature of the crimes that come before them, 
international criminal tribunals have had to reconcile plea bargaining with 
the goals of encouraging remorseful behavior from the defendant and 
promoting the defendant’s rehabilitation, objectives that the Japanese value 
                                           
164
  Id. 
165
  Id. at 1079. 
166
  Id. 
167
  Id.  
168
  Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/1/3 24 (2002), 
Rule 69. 
169
  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 65(1)(c), July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. 
630 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 20 NO. 3 
 
very much.170  As with the truth seeking objective, international tribunals 
have utilized plea bargaining in ways that respect the goals of remorse and 
rehabilitation, and Japan can learn from this example. 
The ICTY Trial Chamber has adopted a practice that one scholar calls 
“negotiated self-condemnation” to advance the goals of remorse and 
rehabilitation.171  Under this practice, the Trial Chamber judge pauses after 
reading aloud each charge that the prosecutor is pursuing and asks the 
defendant if the charge is correct; the defendant must acknowledge the 
accuracy of each charge to move forward with the plea agreement.172  The 
ICTY judges also encourage the defendant to apologize profusely in the 
statement accompanying the guilty plea. 173   These self-condemnatory 
mechanisms rest on the defendant’s acknowledgment of past mistakes and 
thus can be viewed as a court-led expression of remorse and a step towards 
rehabilitation. 
Remorse and rehabilitation also enter more informally into the Trial 
Chamber’s calculus when it decides whether to approve or reject a plea 
agreement.174  In Plavšić, for example, the Trial Chamber made it clear that 
it approved the plea bargain in part because the defendant contributed to 
reestablishing peace and order in the very communities in Bosnia that she 
had ravaged during her reign as president.175  In other words, signs of the 
defendant’s remorse and rehabilitation made Plavšić an appropriate case for 
“negotiated justice” rather than “imposed justice.”176 
 
C.  Courts Can Adopt Victim-Friendly Elements in Plea Bargaining  
 
International criminal tribunals initially faced criticism for permitting 
plea bargaining because international crimes often have hundreds or 
thousands of victims who want to see the defendant brought to justice.177  In 
1994, for example, ICTY judges rejected a proposal from the U.S. 
government to permit plea bargaining as a way of obtaining testimony from 
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defendants about higher-level suspects.178  Judge Cassese, the former ICTY 
President, said for the court, 
[W]e always have to keep in mind that this Tribunal is not a 
municipal criminal court but one that is charged with the task of 
trying persons accused of the gravest possible of all crimes.  
The persons appearing before us will be charged with genocide, 
torture, murder, sexual assault, wanton destruction, persecution 
and other inhumane acts.  After due reflection, we have decided 
that no one should be immune from prosecution for crimes such 
as these, no matter how useful their testimony may otherwise 
be.179 
Despite this initially clear rejection of plea bargaining, the ICTY reversed 
course seven years later when Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald of the United 
States replaced Judge Cassese of Italy as president of the tribunal.180 
The transition to plea bargaining at the ICTY was marked by a new 
understanding of plea bargaining as a method of helping victims of serious 
crimes and members of communities where the crimes occurred.181  Thus, in 
Plavsić, the defense and prosecution agreed that the defendant’s guilty plea 
represented “a significant effort toward the advancement of 
reconciliation.”182  In her statement, Plavšić spoke directly to the victims of 
her crime:  “[My guilty plea] will, I hope, help the Muslim, Croat, and even 
Serb innocent victims not to be overtaken with bitterness . . . .”183 
The Plavšić case can be instructive for Japan because it suggests that 
institutionalized plea bargaining is not necessarily antithetical to a justice 
system that focuses on victims’ concerns.  Quite the opposite, plea 
bargaining can actually further the interests of victims.  Since the defendant 
admits to certain charges when accepting a plea bargain, the plea can 
facilitate the processes of bringing together conflict-ridden communities and 
moving past the crime.184  It also spares the victim the emotional pain, 
danger, or embarrassment of having to publicly recount the circumstances of 
a crime by testifying at trial.185 
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Japan can also emulate international tribunals by adopting a system of 
plea bargaining that contains victim-friendly procedural elements.  For 
example, ICTY procedural rules prohibit equivocal plea bargains, in which 
the defendant pleads guilty but supplements the plea with a legal defense of 
his actions.186  That is, the defendant must make a clear choice to provide the 
victim with closure in one of two ways:  either proceed with trial or fully 
admit guilt with respect to a particular charge.  The ICC’s Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence require the court to notify victims of a prosecutor’s 
decision not to prosecute the defendant for certain charges.187  Victims must 
have an opportunity to respond to such prosecutorial decisions and to 
otherwise participate in the court proceedings.188  The court has discretion to 
obtain victims’ views on “any issue,”189 which is broad enough to cover the 
court’s decision to approve or reject a proposed plea bargain.  Finally, the 
ICC is specifically authorized to order a “more complete presentation of the 
alleged facts” if it believes that doing so is necessary to advance the victims’ 
interests.190  This means that the court can proceed to a full trial to protect 
victims in appropriate cases.  By incorporating these kinds of provisions into 
its own plea bargaining system, Japan can ensure that victims play a role in 
evaluating the fairness of plea bargains. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The mantra of those who support the practice of plea bargaining is 
simplicity, simplicity, simplicity. 191   For all its flaws, plea bargaining 
simplifies the administration of criminal justice and eases burdens on court 
systems.  The rising crime rate in Japan, the shortage of prosecutorial 
resources, and the public’s loss of confidence in prosecuting authorities 
demonstrate the need for simplicity in Japan’s criminal justice system. 
Tacit bargaining is a poor solution to the goal of simplicity.  Because 
tacit bargains are nonnegotiable and rely on a defendant’s confession, they 
reinforce weaknesses of the Japanese justice system, particularly the 
coercive pretrial interrogation environment and restrictions on a defendant’s 
access to counsel.  More generally, tacit bargains exploit the deferential 
culture among Japanese defense attorneys.  In addition, tacit bargains are 
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nonbinding, leaving the defendant without a remedy if the court rejects the 
prosecutor’s recommendation of leniency or the prosecutor breaches the 
agreement. 
Formal plea bargaining succeeds where tacit bargaining fails by 
equalizing power between the defense and prosecution.  Because plea 
bargaining involves the full scope of negotiation, it invites active 
participation from defense counsel.  Moreover, the defendant can withdraw 
his guilty plea if the court rejects the plea agreement and can seek 
enforcement of the agreement if the prosecutor breaches.  Because of these 
features of institutionalized plea bargaining, the adoption of such a system in 
Japan would help make the nation’s justice system friendlier to the 
procedural rights of defendants. 
Finally, a look at the systematic use of plea bargaining in international 
criminal tribunals addresses culturally-based criticisms of the practice in 
Japan.  International criminal tribunals, primarily through procedural rules 
on the implementation of plea bargaining, have used plea bargaining in ways 
that are sensitive to the goals of the Japanese justice system.  Japan could 
benefit from this example.  The Japanese legal community should be more 
pragmatic about the need for simplified criminal justice procedures and 
adopt a system of institutionalized plea bargaining. 
